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CHAPTER 4 
Contracts 
WILLIAM T. SHERRY, JR.• 
§4.1. Non-competition covenants: Covenants ancillary to the sale of 
a business. The courts have ten~ed to classify non-competition agree-
ments on the basis of the type of transaction engendering the covenant. 
The legal consequences of such covenants in turn depend greatly on 
their classification. Two cases decided during the 1973 Survey year 
clearly point out the need to classify such a covenant properly before at-
tempting to determine its legal effect. 
The courts of the Commonwealth have long concurred in the general 
view that an express non-competition agreement ancillary to the sale 
of a business may be enforced if reasonably limited in time and space.l 
If the restriction is too broad as to time or territory, it nevertheless may 
be enforced to the extent necessary to protect the plaintiff.• Additionally, 
where no express agreement exists, the courts-on the theory that the 
seller of a business normally sells the entire business, including good will 
-will often imply a non-competition promise by a seller so as to "give 
to the purchaser what is sold to him."B This rationale was summarized 
in the fairly recent case of Tobin v. Cody:" 
Where, therefore, the sellers of the stock have been active partici-
pants in the business and are in a position to control or affect its 
good will, we think not only that they may validly bind themselves 
by an express promise not to derogate from the good will reflected 
in the value of the stock sold by competing with the buyers remain-
ing in the business, but also that in appropriate circumstances such 
a promise can be implied in the sale of the stock itself. 
• WILLIAM T. SHERRY, JR. is an a&SOdate in the law firm of Nutter, McClennen Be Fish, 
Boston. 
§4.1. 1 Cedric G. Chase Photographic Laboratories, Inc. v. Hennessey, ll27 Mass. 1!17, 
97 N.E.2d ll97 (1951); Becker College v. Gross, 281 Mass. !155, 18ll N.E. 765 (19Sll). 
B Metropolitan Ice Co. v. Ducas, 291 Mass. 40!1, 196 N.E. 856 (19!15); Whiting Milk 
Co. v. O'Connell, 277 Mass. 570, 179 N.E. 169 (1951). 
a Marshall Engine Co. v. New Marshall Engine Co., 20!J Mass. 410, 424, 89 N.E. 548, 
552 (1909). 
4. Mll Mass. 716, 720, 180 N.E.2d 652, 656 (1962). See also Lynn Tucker Sales, Inc. v. 
LeBlanc, li2!J Mass. 721, 724, 84 N.E.2d 127, 129 (1949). 
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In Certified Pest Control Co. v. Kuiper18 decided during the Survey 
year, the Appeals Court relied on Tobin v. Cody as authority for enjoin-
ing the seller of a ten percent interest in a business from soliciting cus-
tomers of that business for a period of five years.· 
In this case, the owners of Certified Pest Control Company obtained 
a decree in superior court enjoining Abraham Kuiper and Bram Pest 
Control, a corporation organized by Kuiper, from soliciting certain of 
Certified's customers for a period of five years, and ordering Kuiper to 
pay Certified a sum of $4,200.6 The Appeal!! Court upheld the superior 
court's finding of an implied covenant that Kuiper would not solicit 
those of Certified's customers who were serviced by Certified on the date 
the defendant terminated his employment. The decision of the superior 
court was based on subsidiary findings of a master that defendant had 
been a ten percent stockholder, as well as an officer, director and service 
manager of Certified until he resigned and sold his stock back to the 
company.T 
The court enunciated the basis for its decision: 
We think that the instant case is governed by the rationale of 
[Tobin]. The facts in that case are similar in many respects to those 
under consideration. There, as here, good will was not mentioned 
in the sale. The sellers, who were substantial shareholders, sold all 
of the stock held by them, they relinquished their offices in the 
corpora~on ..•• In each case the buyers reasonably expected that 
they were purchasing all of the seller's interest in the corporation.& 
It is submitted that the court's reliance on Tobin v. Cody is misplaced. 
For one thing, Tobin and Cody had each owned one-half of the shares 
of a corporation engaged in the scrap metal business until, pursuant to 
a written agreement, Tobin purchased the entire Cody interest. As in 
the present case, the good will of the business was mentioned neither 
during the negotiations nor in any agreement. Some four years later, 
Cody proceeded to establish a scrap metal business a short distance from · 
and in the same city as the original enterprise, then conducted by Tobin. 
The Supreme Judicial Court implied a non-competition agreement and 
enjoined Cody from competing against Tobin. In Certified~ on the other 
hand, only a ten percent interest was sold. Clearly, such an interest in a 
closely held corporation does not resemble the "substantial ownership" 
transferred in Tobin.& 
G 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 217, 294 N,J!:.2d 548. 
6 Id., 294 N.E.2d at 549. 
7 Id. at 220-21, 294 N.E.2d at 551. 
8 Id. (emphasis added). 
9 The court's reliance on Cap's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Caproni, M7 Mass. 211, 196 N.E.2d 
874 (1964), seems similarly misplaced. In Caps, the defendant sold a one-third interest 
in a corporation, and the circumstaJ;J.ces of the sale dearly indicate that a non-competi-
tion agreement was implied. 
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Furthermore, a non-competition agreement should not have been 
implied in Certified because Kuiper had expressly refused to sign one.10 
In Tobin1 the Supreme Judicial Court based its finding of a non-com-
petition agreement on the theory that "any reasonable person in the 
Tobins' position would have believed unequivocally that the Tobins 
were buying out any competition from the Codys." Kuiper, on the other 
hand, had considered himself unduly constrained by the terms of a 
non-competition agreement required as a condition of his employment 
by the father of the plaintiffs, the Fleischers, prior to the formation of 
Certified. Consequently, he made clear to the Fleischers that he would 
never again hobble himself in the pursuit of his trade by signing such 
an agreement.n In light of this fact, it is doubtful that a reasonable 
person would have believed "unequivocally" that Kuiper had agreed 
not to compete with Certified. 
In summary, it is submitted that the court's finding in the Certified 
case of a non-competition agreement ancillary to the sale of a business 
was not warranted under Tobin v. Cody. Arguably, the court's implica-
tion of a non-competition agreement could have been based on the 
theory that Kuiper, as a former officer, director and key employee of 
Certified, breached a fiduciary duty by using to his own advantage and 
to the detriment of his former employer confidential information gained 
in the course of his employment.12 However, this theory was not con-
sidered by the court. 
§4.2. Non-competition covenants: post employment covenants. The 
Massachusetts courts have long followed the basic doctrine announced 
in Sherman v. Pfefferkom1 with regard to post employment contracts not 
10 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 218, 294 N.E.2d at 549. 
11 Id. 
12 Aronson v. Orlov, 228 Mass. 1, 4-5, 116 N.E. 951, 952 (1917): d. Woolley's Laundry, 
Inc. v; Silva, 25 N.E.2d 899 (Mass. 19!10), where the court held that where names and 
address were furnished ~ a laundry driver in expectation-not expressed to the driver 
-that he would not disclose or use this information for his personal gain, the laundry 
driver did not breach any duty owing tO the employer, nor did he use any confidential 
information, when upon the termination of his employment he solicited the business 
of the employer's customers. Id. at 905. However, it would seem that this case is dis-
tinguishable from Certified on the fact that the driver in Woolley's had not been an 
olicer or director of the company. 
§4.2. 1 241 Mass. 468, 155 N.E. 568 (1922). In Sherman, the Supreme Judicial Court, 
quoting from Lord M'Naughten's decision in Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns Be 
Ammunition Co., [1894] A.C. 555, summarized the basis of this rule: 
"The public have an interest in every person's carrying on his trade freely: so has 
the individual. All interference with individual liberty of action in trading, and 
all restraints of trade of themselves, if there is nothing more, are contrary to public 
policy, and therefore void. That is the general rule. But there are exemptions: 
restraints of trade and interference with individual liberty of action may be justified 
by the special circumstances of a particular case. It is a sufficient justification, • • • 
if the restriction is reasonable-reasonable, that is, • • • in reference to the in-
3
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to compete: such covenants may be enforced by injunction "if the inter-
est to be protected is consonant with public policy and if the restraint 
is limited reasonably in time and space."2 As in the case of non-com-
petition covenants ancillary to the sale of a business, the court will enforce 
an overly broad covenant to the extent necessary to protect the plaintiff.8 
As a general rule, however, a covenant restricting competition by an 
employee after termination of his employment will not be implied by 
the courts of the Commonwealth.• As a result, employment contracts of 
key employees frequently contain detailed non-competition clauses. 
Usually, these clauses are extremely broad in their scope and for that 
reason often become the subject of litigation. In Massachusetts, there is 
neither a prima facie rule nor a presumption of law that any particular 
extent of time or limitation with respect to territory is reasonable in 
the context of a non-competition agreement. The courts have instead 
decided to handle the question of the enforceability of such covenants 
on a case-by-case basis.ll 
During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had 
occasion in Wilson v. Clarke6 to review the law of the Commonwealth 
with respect to the question of the enforceability of a covenant restricting 
terests of the public, so framed and so guarded as to afford adequate protection to 
the party in whose favor it is imposed, while at the same time it is in no way 
injurious to the public. That, I think, is the fair result of all the authorities." 
2 Cedric G. Chase Photographic Laboratories, Inc. v. Hennessey, !!27 Mass. 1!!7, 1!!9, 
97 N.E.2d !!97, !!98 (1951) (citations omitted). 
s Metropolitan Ice Co. v. Ducas, 291 Mass. 40!!, 196 N.E. 856 (19!!5). 
4 While a covenant restricting competition after termination of employment has 
never been implied by the Massachusetts courts, it is well established that if in the 
mur,e ot his employment an employee gains knowledge of confidential information in 
the torm of trade and business secrets, an injunction will normally be granted to 
prevent disclosure and use of such confidential information. Aronson v. Orlov, 228 
Mass. 1, 116 N.E. 951 (1917): Junker v. Plummer, !!20 Mass. 76, 67 N.E.2d 667 (1946). It 
is equally well established, however, that on termination of employment, a person may 
use general skill and knowledge acquired during the course of his employment. Padover 
v. Axelson, 268 Mass. 148, 167 N.E. !!01 (1929): DiAngeles v. Scauzillo, 287 Mass. 291, 191 
N.E. 426 (19!!4). 
II Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shevrin, !!42 Mass. 714, 175 N.E.2d !!74 (1961) (de-
fendant/sales manager embezzled $1!!0,000 from plaintiff); Wrentham Co. v. Cann, M5 
Mass. 7!!7, 189 N.E.2d 559 (196!!) (defendant solicited plaintiff's customers four days after 
the termination of his employment). But see Loranger Const. Co. v. C. Franklin Corp., 
!!55 Mass. 727, 247 N.E.2d !!91 (1969), where the court enforced a three-year contract 
between two corporations and the chief executive officer of the defendant corporation. 
However, this case is distinguishable from the normal restraint in an employment con-
tract since a sale of business was involved. Notwithstanding this lack of a categorical 
rule, a review of the Massachusetts cases indicates that the court will probably not 
enforce a covenant restricting competition after termination of employment for more 
than a three year period. In fact, since 194!!, in only two cases falling within this 
category has the court enforced such a covenant for a period more than two years (in 
both cases, for three yeara) and, in both, the defendant blatantly acted in bad faith. 
6 470 F.2d 1218 (1st Cir. 1972). 
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competition after termination of employment. In Wilson, Mr. Clarke, 
a former employee of a partnership of psychologists who served as pro-
fessional consultants to businesses and other organizations, promised to 
pay certain fees to the partnership if he left its employ and provided 
any of its clients or prospective clients with similar services.' In 1966, 
Clarke left the partnership and began working for International Tele-
phone&: Telegraph (ITT), a client of the partnership. The partnership 
subsequently sued Clarke on the basis that it was entitled to fifteen 
percent of Clarke's salary pursuant to the parties' agreement.8 
The district court found that Clarke spent less than one percent of 
his time working with ITT on professional psychological matters and 
therefore denied the plaintiff's claim.& On appeal, the partnership argued 
that the amount of time spent by Clarke performing professional psy-
chological services for ITT was irrelevant because the critical inquiry 
under the applicable section of the parties' agreement was whether he 
had furnished professional psychological services "of any sort" to a 
former client of theirs.1o 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's 
decision, holding that regardless of whether or not Clarke had violated 
the parties' agreement, no recovery was warranted under the rule first 
set forth in Sherman v. Pfeflerkom:ll 
In cases of agreements forbidding an employee to engage in the 
same business or line of activity as the employer, attention is often 
given to whether the agreement is reasonably limited as to area 
and duration. But such considerations are merely aspects of the rule 
[derived from Sherman] that the agreement must be no wider than 
is necessary to afford reasonable protection to the employer. A fur-
ther, and .here more relevant, aspect of the rule is that an employer 
'f Section 4 of the agreement between Clarke and the partnership provided in part 
that: 
[I]f, at any time during a five (5) year period comm.encing on the day following 
the termination of -your employment, any clients ••• of the firm shall, directly, or 
indirectly, receive professional paychological services of any sort from -you, or from 
any ••• corporation of which -you shall become an ••• employee; then, -you shall 
pay to the firm for said five (5) year period or such shorter period as -you ••• 
shall be, directly or indirectly, performing professional psychological services of 
any sort for said client or clients, the greater of either (A) an amount equal to 
fifteen percent (15%) of the groBB billings received from said client or clients 
••• by any said corporation, or (B) an amount equal to fifteen percent (15%) of 
the total remuneration received by -you by way of income, salary, wages, collllllbslons 
or otherwise from said ••• corporation. 
ld. at 1219-20, n.1. 
8 Id. at 1220. 
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may not enforce limitations on an ex-employee's engaging in ac-
tivities which do no damage to the employer.1J 
It is clear that Clarke's employment at ITT did not damage the part-
nership. As the court noted, Clarke's duties at ITT neither diminished 
nor dispensed with the need for the partnership's services, nor was the 
partnership a caJldidate for Clarke's position. Accordingly, the court held 
that no recovery was wattanted because the alleged breach did not cause 
any damage to the partnership.u 
With respect to the partnership's claim that it was entitled to recover 
under the terms of the agreement because of the specialized training 
they had provided Clarke, the court, after noting that a man's aptitudes, 
skill and mental ability are his own and not his employer's, reasoned 
as follows: 
Doubtless an employer who has provided specialized training to 
an employee--as by a course of studies or the like-might reason-
ably contract with the employee for reimbursement if the employee 
should quit before the employer achieves any benefit. However, the 
employer may not require its ex-employee to make payments to 
it unrelated to the employer's damage, simply as a penalty to dis-
courage or punish a job change. At most, the employer, in appro-
priate circumstances, might require the employee to reimburse it 
for a sum, or under a formula, reasonably related to what it cost 
the employer to train him, or to retrain a replacement, or the like,l' 
In applying this reasoning to the terms of the parties' agreement, the 
court found that the partnership had not shown that the clause in the 
agreement providing for damages in the event of even· minimal inter-
ference with clients of. the partnership was a reasonable forecast of 
damages resulting from Clarke's alleged breach.lll 
. §4.8. Rules for the construction of contract terms. Recently, the 
Massachusetts Court of Appeals in Lembo v. Watersl had occasion to 
summarize and apply certain basic rules of contract construction. In 
that case, the plaintiff,. an attorpey. with substantial real estate expertise,• 
was the owner. of a parcel of land in Natick, Massachusetts. The defen-
dant, who desired to construct a nursing home, learned that the plaintiff 
was looking for a purchaser for his property. After examination of and 
negotiation over the property, the . plaintiff and the. defendant executed 
12 Id. at 1221-22. 
18 Id. at 1222. 
14 Id. at 122ll. 
111 Id. 
§4.ll. 1 197ll M318. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 26ll, 294 N.E.2d 566. 
2 Id. at 264, 294 N.E.2d at 567. 
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on August 9, 1966 a purchase and sale agreement for the parcel.a The 
agreement provided in part as follows: 
6. PURCHASE PRICE: The agreed purchase price for said 
premises is $46,800.00 dollars [sic], of which $2,000.00 have been paid 
as a deposit this day and $8,000.00 are to be paid at the time of 
delivery of the deed in cash, and a note for $36,800.00 without inter-
est and secured by a real estate mortgage or mortgages payable in 
or within fifteen months from the date of final state approval. 
7. TIME FOR PERFORMANCE; DEUVERY OF DEED: 
Such deed is to be delivered within sixty days of the date of this 
agreement provided nevertheless that all necessary extensions shall 
be granted for purposes of obtaining necessary state permits, and 
approvals .... 
25. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS: The performance of this 
Agreement is conditioned on the buyer obtaining all necessary state 
permits and approvals for the construction and operation of a nurs-
ing home with a minimum of eighty beds and the buyer agrees to 
exert every diligent effort to obtain said permits.' 
The plaintiff was familiar with the rules and regulations pertaining to 
the construction and operation of nursing homes. The defendant was in 
the real estate business, and had previously operated two nursing homes.11 
On October 17, 1966, the plaintiff notified the defendant that he was 
in violation of the seventh clause of the parties' agreement, and that 
he was expected to purchase the property in accordance with the terms 
of that agreement. On December 21, 1966, the defendant told the plain-
tiff that he had received a copy of the site plan approval from the Depart-
ment of Public Health, and that nothing stood in the way of the com-
pletion of the agreement. The defendant asked the plaintiff to contact 
his attorney; the plaintiff did so, and suggested that papers be passed 
in January.e The defendant failed to respond to this suggestion and sub-
sequently told the plaintiff that he was no longer interested in purchasing 
the property because it was not a good site for a nursing home. Addi-
tionally, the defendant contended that the provisions of the twenty-fifth 
clause of the purchase and sale agreement conditioning his performance 
on his obtaining "all necessary state permits and approvals for the con-
struction and operation of a nursing home"7 had not been fulfilled. In 
particular, he argued that one of the necessary permits, a permit for 
occupancy, could not have been obtained until after the construction 
aId. 
4 Id. at n.I. 
II ld. 
G ld. at 264-65, 294 N.E.2d at 567-68. 
7 Id. at 264, n.l, 294 N.E.2d at 567, n.I. 
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of the nursing home had been completed. Thereafter, the plaintiff 
brought suit to obtain specific performance of the parties' purchase and 
sale agreement. After the institution of the suit, the property was sold to 
others, and the plaintiff filed a substitute bill of complaint seeking to 
recover damages for the defendant's alleged breach. The superior court 
judge entered a decree in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant 
appealed.& 
In effect, the defendant urged the Appeals Court to interpret the 
twenty-fifth clause to mean that the nursing home had to be fully erected, 
equipped, and operational before the conditions stated in such clause 
would be fulfilled. While a literal reading of that clause is consistent 
with the defendant's contention, the Appeals Court correctly held that 
the clause was not entitled to special emphasis, "but •.. must be given 
such effect as a fair construction of the entire contract shows the parties 
intended [it] should have.''& The court then went on to point out that 
the defendant's construction of the clause was inconsistent with the 
sixth and seventh clauses.10 There can be no doubt that the construction 
of the twenty-fifth clause as urged by the defendant at least conflicts with 
the seventh clause.u The language of the seventh clause establishes the 
time for performance as the delivery of the deed, which delivery was 
to take place "within sixty days of the date of the .•• agreement ... .'' 
Clearly, as the court noted, the parties could not have contemplated that 
the nursing home would be constructed and fully operational within 
a sixty day period.12 However, judicial resolution of this inconsistency 
did not resolve the key issue, namely, the determination of exactly what 
state permits were contemplated by the language of the twenty-fifth 
clause. In order to resolve this question, the court looked to the conduct 
of the parties.18 In so doing, it was noted that the defendant's statement 
of December 21, 1967, to the effect that nothing stood in the way of the 
completion of the agreement, indicated that a literal interpretation of 
8 Id. at 265, 294 N.E.2d at 567. 
8 Id. at 267, 294 N.E.2d at 569, citing Central Trust Co. v. Rudnick, 510 Mass. 259, 
244, 57 N.E.2d 469, 472 (1941). 
10 The basis of the inconsistency found by the court between clause 25 and clause 6 
is not clear. An analysis of these two clauses indicates that they compound, rather than 
resolve, the issue of contract mnstruction. Both of these clauses make reference to state 
permits and state approvals, and it is the determination of the prease exten.t to which 
state permits and approvals were needed before the remaining terms of the purchase 
and sale agreement had to be complied with that is the critical inquiry in Lembo. 
11 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 264, n.l, 294 N.E.2d at 567, n.l. 
12 Id. at 267, 294 N.E.2d at 569. 
18 Id. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Cunningham, SOS Mass. 16, 21, 20 N.E.2d 471, 474 (1959), 
where the court held that the conduct of the parties after execution of a rontract is 
relevant and admissible in evidence as an aid in interpreting ambiguous language. It 
should be noted that such evidence is not admitted to vary or enlarge the agreement, 
but rather to define the meaning of the terms used by the parties. See Bachinsky v. 
Rogers, 275 Mass. 581, 171 N.E. 549 (19!10). 
8
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the condition precedent to performance in the twenty-fifth clause was 
unwarranted.14 The court accordingly affirmed the lower court's decision. 
The construction accorded the parties' agreement by the court in 
Lembo constituted a rejection of a technical rule of construction in favor 
of one designed to determine the intention of the parties. In so con-
struing, the court-correctly, it is submitted-rejected an interpretation 
based, in all probability, on the defendant's strained reading of the law 
subsequent to his breach, rather than on his intention at the time the 
contract was made. 
One caveat may possibly be in order. Although the court consistently 
spoke in terms of conventional contract law and general canons of inter-
pretation, the fact nevertheless remains that a striking amount of special 
expertise permeates the fact situation in Lembo. Not only the plaintiff 
and the defendant, but even the prospective purchaser of the property, 
were familiar with the law of real estate and had, moreover, particular 
experience with nursing homes. It is submitted that, despite the lack of 
emphasis upon these peculiar characteristics of the parties involved, the 
court might well have been less than impervious to their existence. 
§4.4. Commission contract with a real estate broker. It is hornbook 
law that an owner of real property who engages a broker is liable for 
the broker's commission, absent special circumstances, if the broker pro-
duces a customer ready, willing and able to buy upon the terms for 
the price given the broker by the owner.1 Nonetheless, the proliferation 
of litigation involving exactly this question continues unabated. During 
the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court was again presented the 
issue in Gaynor v. Laverdure.2 In its decision, the court succinctly sum-
marized the law in this area,8 and left no doubt as to its disinclination 
to deviate from existing precedent. 
In Gaynor, Laverdure, the defendant, a licensed real estate broker, 
engaged Gaynor, the plaintiff, also a licensed real estate broker, to assist 
him in selling certain property which he himself owned. The parties 
agreed that plaintiff would receive a ten percent commission from the 
defendant "'[o]n whatever price she could get a ready, willing and able 
buyer to agree to pay for it.' "4 
The plaintiff subsequently submitted an unconditional offer by one 
Callahan, who desired to purchase the land for $99,000. On January 24, 
1968, the defendant, after consultation with his attorney, signed an 
agreement with Callahan whereby the defendant agreed to sell and con-
vey the land to Callahan for $99,000, of which $1,000 was paid on the 
14 197!1 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 268, 294 N.E.2d at 569. 
§4.4. 1 Henderson&: Beal, Inc. v. Glen, !129 Mass. 748, 110 N.E.2d !17!1 (195!1). 
2 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. 111, 291 N.E.2d 617: 
a Id. at 115-16, 291 N.E.2d at 621. 
' Id. at 112, 291 N.E.2d at 619. 
9
Sherry: Chapter 4: Contracts
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1973
------- -- ----
114 1973 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §4.4 
date of the signing, with the balance to be paid on August 11, 1968 at 
the conveyance.li 
On August 11, 1968, Callahan did not pay the balance of the purchase 
price and did not take title as required by the agreement. Thereafter, 
the plaintiff demanded payment of her commission from the defendant, 
who refused to pay her.e The plaintiff subsequently brought suit. At the 
trial in superior court, before Judge Mitchell, the plaintiff requested 
that the jury, in effect, be instructed that the defendant owed plaintiff 
the agreed commission of $9,000. Instead, the judge charged the jury 
that it was within their province to determine whether or not the plain-
tiff had produced a ready, willing and able buyer, and, if so, to deter-
mine what amount of money was a fair and reasonable compensation 
for her services. 7 
The jury found for the plaintiff in the amount of $1,000, and de-
fendant appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court held erroneous both the 
judge's refusal to instruct the jury as requested by the plaintiff, and the 
giving of the instruction described above. In the course of its opinion, 
the court thoroughly reviewed the law of the Commonwealth on the 
subject of brokers' commissions.s These rules can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. When the broker has produced a customer ready, willing, and 
able to buy upon the terms and for the price given by the owner, 
the broker's commission is earned. It is immaterial whether or not 
a contract is made, or, if made, whether or not it is performed.9 
2. While a broker who has procured a customer is not obliged to 
see that the owner and the customer enter into a binding contract, 
if no such contract is made, the broker suing for his commission 
has the burden of proving that his customer was ready, willing, and 
able to buy on the terms set by the owner.lO If, however, the seller 
and the buyer produced by the broker do enter into a valid and 
binding agreement, the broker is entitled to the commission even if 
the customer lacks the ability to pay.n 
5 Id. 
6 The defendant had no question in his mind about the good faith of either the 
plaintiff or Callahan, and no such issue was presented in the case. 
7 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at ll!J, 291 N.E.2d at 619-20. 
8 Id. at ll3·23, 291 N.E.2d at 620·25. 
9 Talanian v. Phippen, 357 Mass. 765, 256 N.E.2d 445 (1970); Green v. Levenson, 241 
Mass. 223, 135 N.E. ll4 (1922); Fitzpatrick v. Gilson, 176 Mass. 477, 57 N.E. 1000 (1900). 
10 Lacombe v. Martin, 319 Mass. ll6, 64 N.E.2d 622 (1946); Barsky v. Hansen, 3ll 
Mass. 14, 40 N.E.2d 12 (1942). 
11 The rationale underlying this rule is that the act of the seller in entering into a 
valid contract with the customer works as an acceptance of that customer as one ready, 
able and willing to buy the land and pay for it. See Richards v. Gilbert, 336 Mass. 617, 
146 N.E.2d 921 (1958); Menton v. Melvin, 330 Mass. 355, 11!1 N.E.2d 447 (1953). See also 
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The rationale underlying this latter rule is that the act of the seller 
in entering into a valid contract with the customer works as an acceptance 
of that customer as one ready, willing, and able to buy the land and to 
pay for it. In the 1958 case of Menton v. Melvin,U for instance, the 
plaintiff was a registered real estate broker, with whom the defendant 
listed her residence for sale. Defendant, who was asking $10,500 for the 
house, agreed upon enlisting plaintiff's services that plaintiff would 
receive a five percent commission .. Subsequendy, plaintiff produced as 
prospective buyers the O'Clairs, who entered into a written agreement 
with defendant to purchase the house at the asking price, but who 
eventually were unable to secure a mortgage suitable to their means and 
were thus unable to consummate the purchase.1a Defendant returned to 
the O'Clairs the one hundred dollar deposit which they had made. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, upholding the district court's finding 
for the plaintiff broker in the amount of $525, found both the O'Clairs' 
default and the defendant's return of the O'Clairs' deposit irrelevant 
as regarded what was conceptualized as the plaintiff's already vested right 
to her commission. The very act of listing the house with the plaintiff, 
the court reasoned, was an employment of the plaintiff to find a custo-
mer ready, willing and able to buy the defendant's property, and in-
cluded an inherent understanding by both parties that the terms of the 
employment would be fulfilled, and the broker's commission earned, 
upon production of such customers. The execution of the agreement 
between the defendant and the O'Clairs worked as an acceptance by 
the defendant of the O'Clairs as precisely such customers; no subsequent 
occurrences, including the falling through of the purchase, could divest 
the plaintiff of her right to her fee.14 
The Supreme Judicial Court went even further in the 1958 case of 
Spence v. Lawrence.1fl There, a prospective seller of a house was found 
bound to pay a broker's commission subsequent to the production by 
that broker of a purportedly ready, willing and able customer-not-
withstanding the facts that the customer in question was eventually re-
jected by the seller, and that no written agreement was entered into 
between the seller and this particular customer. Even oral negotiations 
for the purchase of a property, it would seem, constitute an acceptance 
of the customer by the seller for the purposes of vesting the broker's 
right to a commission.1o 
Spence v. Lawrence, llll7 Mass. ll55, 149 N.E.2d ll79 (1958), where it is indicated that an 
oral or implied acceptance of the purchaser or the seller may have the same effect as 
the execution of a formal contract insofar as the question of ability to pay is concerned. 
12 ll!lO Mass. ll55, llll N.E.2d 447 (195!J). 
18 Id. at !J56, ll!J N.E.2d at 447. 
u Id., ll!J N.E.2d at 447-48. See also Richards v. Gilbert, !J!J6 Mass. 617, 146 N.E.2d 
921 (1958). 
1fl !J!J7 Mass.ll55, 149 N.E.2d ll79 (1958). 
10 Id. at 358-59, 149 N.E.2d at ll81. 
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There is little doubt that the law in the Commonwealth with respect 
to the payment of brokerage commissions is extremely harsh on sellers 
of property.lT However, as the court noted in the Gaynor case, a seller 
has ample means to ameliorate harsh consequences. For example, by use 
of appropriate language he may condition his liability for a brokerage 
commission upon the actual payment of the full purchase price by the 
customer whom the broker procures.1s 
It may be argued that the rule of law reiterated by the court in Gaynor 
is unrealistic. When an owner of property lists that property with a 
broker, his expectation is that the money for the payment of the com-
mission will come out of the proceeds of the sale. As a practical matter, 
most owners, because they lack the time, money and sophistication, do 
not investigate the financial status of the customer. Accordingly, the 
Massachusetts rule permitting a broker to satisfy his obligation to the 
owner by tendering a person who is in some way "accepted" by the 
seller, seems in conflict with the realities of the broker-vendor· relation-
ship. From a pragmatic viewpoint, a buyer's willingness and ability to 
pay is demonstrated at the time of closing of title, not when he signs 
the purchase and sale agreement. 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the court's decision in Gaynor puts 
the burden of determining the financial ability of a customer on the 
wrong shoulders. If Laverdure, a licensed real estate broker who acted 
with the counsel of an attorney, could become liable for a $9,000 com-
mission to a broker who did not in fact produce a ready, willing and 
able buyer, one can imagine the vulnerability of the average layman/ 
homeowner to the broker who readily offers his services. 
STUDENT COMMENT 
§4.5. Recovery for breach of a physician-patient contract: Reliance 
vs. expectancy damages: SuUivan v. O'Connor,1 Jfle decision in this case 
is a significant development in Massachusetts medical litigation because 
it allows the recovery of comprehensive damages based on the plaintiff-
1T See, e.g., Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 256 A.2d 845 (1967), wherein 
the court chan~ the law in New Jersey (which was similar to the law in Massachu-
setts) to a rule providing that a broker earns his commission only when (a) he produces 
a purchaser ready, wilHng, and able to buy on the terms fixed by the owner, (b) the 
purchaser enters into a binding contract with the owner, and (c) the purchaser com-
pletes the transaction, unless the failure results from the wrongful act or Interference 
of the seller. Id. at 551-52, 256 A.2d at 855. 
The rationale in Johnson was specifically rejected by the court in Gaynor. 1975 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 121, 291 N.E.2d at 624. 
18 Such a limitation must be clear and unambiguous. See, e.g., Maher v. Haycock, 501 
Mass. 594, 18 N.E.2d M8 (1958); Alvord v. Cook, 174 Mass. 120, 54 N.E. 499 (1899). 
§4.5. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 75!1, 296 N.E.2d 185. 
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patient's reliances, including her pain, suffering, and mental distress, for 
the breach of an express physician-patient contract. The plaintiff, an 
entertainer, had asked the defendant plastic surgeon to perform cosmetic 
surgery changing the shape and size of her nose. She alleged that the 
defendant had agreed and promised to enhance her beauty and improve 
her appearance by performing two operations. In fact, three operations 
were required, and the appearance of her nose was substantially worsened. 
At the trial there was expert testimony to the effect that her nose could 
not be improved by any further surgery. 
The plaintiff's action consisted of two counts. The first count alleged 
a contract between the plaintiff and defendant which the defendant had 
breached by failing to improve plaintiff's nasal appearance. The breach 
allegedly resulted in disfigurement of plaintiff's nose, worsening of her 
appearance, pain and suffering in body and mind, great medical expense, 
and deprivation of earning capacity.2 The second count alleged mal-
practice based upon the defendant's negligence performance of nasal 
surgery.3 The defendant answered these counts with a general denial. 
The case was tried before a jury, which, in response to special questions 
on the issues of liability,4 returned a verdict for the plaintiff on the con-
tract count and for the defendant on the negligence count. On the issue 
of damages, the trial court judge instructed the jury that the plaintiff 
was entitled to recover her out-of-pocket expenses incident to the opera-
tions as well as all other damages flowing directly, naturally, proximately 
and foreseeably from the defendant's breach of promise.li The jury was 
further instructed that the damages awarded should comprehend damages 
for disfigurement, including the effects of the consciousness of such dis-
figurement on the plaintiff's mind; in this connection, the jury was 
permitted to consider the plaintiff's profession. The trial court also 
instructed that the pain and suffering attendant to the third operation 
were compensable.6 Based upon these instructions, the jury awarded the 
plaintiff $13,500. 
The defendant physician did not appeal the issue of contract formation. 
However, he excepted to the instructions given to the jury regarding 
damages on the ground that the jury should have been allowed to con-
sider only the plaintiff's out-of-pocket expenses, and more specifically, 
on the ground that the plaintiff should not have been allowed to recover 
for disfigurement, pain and suffering or mental distress. The defendant 
based his exceptions on the contention that damages for pain, suffering 
and mental distress are characteristic of tort actions and are not compen-
2 Id. at 753-55, 296 N.E.2d at 184-85. 
3 Id. at 753, 296 N.E.2d at 184. 
4 See Record, Lobby Conference and Charge to the Jury, 6, Sullivan v. O'Connor, 
1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 753, 296 N.E.2d 183. 
II 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 754,296 N.E.2d at 185. 
6 Id. 
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sable in an action alleging breach of contract.7 Contending that she was 
entitled to recover fully for her unfulfilled expectations, the plaintiff 
excepted to the trial court's refusal to charge that she could recover 
expectancy damages, that is, damages based upon the entire difference 
between the nose as promised and the nose as it appeared after the 
operation. The plaintiff, however, expressly agreed to waive her exception 
in the event that the Supreme Judicial Court overruled the defendant's 
exceptions. 8 
The Supreme Judicial Court overruled all of the defendant's exceptions 
and HELD: the plaintiff was entitled to collect damages for all the items 
enumerated in the charge to the jury under either an expectancy theory 
or a reliance theory of damages. 9 The court did not have to reach the 
issue of whether damages for a plaintiff's full expectations could be 
awarded for the breach of a physician-patient contract because Alice 
Sullivan did not seek to recover such damages. However, the opinion 
indicated that the court favored the more limited reliance measure of 
damages. This tendency is evidenced by the conclusion that, "there is 
much to be said, then, for applying a reliance measure to the present 
facts ... ,"10 
The holding of the Sullivan case is limited since, as the court noted, 
the parties did not make claims which would have forced the court to 
reach all of the issues involved in physician-patient contracts and the 
damages recoverable from breaches thereo£.11 The court treated some of 
these issues in dicta in order to clarify common law policy in this area. 
For instance, although the issue of contract formation was not appealed, 
the court diseussed the issue of the burden of proof in actions alleging 
breach of an express physician-patient contract.12 The court also dis-
cussed the relative applicability of the reliance and expectancy measures 
of damages to recovery for breaches of physician-patient contracts, al-
though the plaintiff expressly waived her claim for a recovery based on 
her expectations.18 In reality, then, the court utilized this case as a means 
of presenting its prospective intentions in the field of physician-patient 
contract litigation. While the dicta in the decision does not rise to the 
level of binding precedent, it does articulate a judicial attitude which 
may significantly influence the common law of the Commonwealth with 
respect to medical litigation. 
7 Id. at 755, 296 N.E.2d at 185. 
8 Id. The plaintiff apparently excepted in order to secure a new trial if the 
favorable trial verdict were reversed on the defendant's appeal. Since the plaintiff was 
satisfied with the trial court verdict, a waiver of her exceptions was appropriate if 
that verdict was preserved. 
9 Id. at 762, 296 N.E.2d at 189. 
10 Id. at 759, 296 N.E.2d at 188. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 756,296 N.E.2d at 186. 
18 Id. at 756-60, 296 N.E.2d at 186-88. 
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The extensive discussion and analysis of the Sullivan case by the court 
was permeated with indications that the court believed the express 
physician-patient contract to be a special situation in terms of both 
contract formation and damages recoverable for breach. The court stated 
;that actions would be allowed on alleged physician-patient contracts 
" but that "clear proof" would be required to establish the existence of 
such contracts.14 In addition, the court suggested that the reliance measure 
of damages is the most just to all parties concerned in such cases. Essen-
tially the court appears to be splitting the risks of contract between the 
physician and patient on grounds of public policy. The medical profes-
sion is somewhat shielded from fraudulent, frivolous, and extremely 
tenuous claims by the "clear proof' requirement, which will at least re-
quire fact finders to carefully scrutinize the evidence in such cases, and 
may require a plaintiff to prove contract formation by more than a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.111 The application of the reliance measure of 
damages also protects the physician from the greater financial liability 
which would usually result from the application of the expectancy 
measure of damages. The patient, on the other hand, is protected through 
judicial recognition of the physician's ability to contract and his liability 
in case of breach. 
While Sullivan is neither a case of first impression in Massachusetts in 
the area of express physician-patient contracts,18 nor the first Massachusetts 
case in which damages were awarded for pain and suffering17 or mental 
anguish18 in a contract action, it is, however, the first Massachusetts 
decision involving a breach of an express physician-patient contract which 
resulted in damages for pain, suffering, and mental distress. It is there-
fore important to analyze the judicial policy judgments expressed in 
Sullivan in terms of traditional legal theory in order to discover whether 
the court has indeed forged a new area of contract law or merely elected 
to adhere to traditional contract concepts in light of the public policy 
aspects of the medico-legal field. This note will examine the characteristics 
of physician-patient agreements and attempt to clarify the relationship of 
such agreements to the group of compacts which society has, through the 
judicial process, elected to enforce as legally binding contracts. 
The process of determining whether an agreement is, or should be, 
14 Id. at 756, 296 N.E.2d at 186. 
111 C. McCormick, Evidence §MO at 796, (2d ed. 1972). 
18 See Sherlag v. Kelley, 200 Mass. 2!12, 86 N.E. 29!1 (1908), where the plaintiff 
recovered damages from the defendant physician for the latter's breach of an express 
contract to perform specified medical services. 
17 See McClean v. University Club, !127 Mass. 68, 97 N.E~d 194 (1951), where the 
plaintiff guest recovered damages for mental harm resulting from the breach of an 
innkeeper-guest contract. 
18 See Frewen v. Page, 2!18 Mass. 499, 1!11 N.E. 475 (1921), and McClean v. University 
Club, !127 Mass. 68, 97 N.E.2d 174 (1951), where damages for breaches of innkeeper-
guest contracts included compensation for mental anguish. 
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a legally binding contract is best begun by examining the formation of 
the compact. Many jurisdictions recognize that a physician may contract 
to bring about a given result and will be held liable for a breach of such 
an express contract.1Sa However, at least one jurisdiction requires a strict 
evidentiary test, as a means of establishing the formation of the physician-
patient contract.19 Courts in other jurisdictions have declined to establish 
such elevated burdens of proof but have noted the potential for mistake 
and fraud by plaintiffs in the area and have consequently warned that 
fact finders should carefully scrutinize all evidence of an alleged physician-
patient contract.20 It is unclear which of these evidentiary weighing 
processes the Supreme Judicial Court meant to endorse when it noted 
that "[t]he law has taken the middle of the road position of allowing 
actions based on alleged contract, but insisting on clear proof."21 The 
court referred to clear proof as a "requirement"22_which would seem 
.j ·to indicate a definite standard of proof-but then ~tated only that jury 
instructions "may"23 stress such a requirement. Perhaps the court meant 
that jury instructions may stress the requirement instead of simply recit-
ing it. None of this really determines whether the court meant to imply 
that physician-patient contract formation should be proved by more than 
a preponderance of the evidence, or merely suggested that fact finders 
be certain that contract formation is clearly proved. However, it would 
seem, in light of the general reluctance of Massachusetts courts to require 
proof by more than a preponderance of the evidence in civil cases,24 and 
the lack of a precedent for requiring "clear proof," that the court did not 
intend to imply that it would establish a specific new burden of proof 
should the issue arise again in the Commonwealth. However, whether they 
intended to establish an elevated proof requirement or not, the court 
certainly notified the Massachusetts judiciary and public that all fact 
finders would at least be expected carefully and cautiously to examine 
and weigh the evidence in all physician-patient contract actions. Such a 
requirement is not necessarily an aberration of contract law created to 
protect physicians and medical progress. Instead, it represents a judicial 
endeavor to define the set of enforceable promises, or contracts, within 
the universe of all promises. 
Contractual theory has evolved so that some promises merit societal 
18& See, e.g., Stewart v. Rudner, !149 Mich. 459, 84 N.W .2d 816 (1957); Hood v. 
Moffett, 109 Miss. 757, 69 So. 664 (1915); Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 
(1929); Robins v. Finestone, !108 N.Y. 54!1, 127 N.E.2d !ISO (1955). 
19 Gault v. Sideman, 52 Ill. App.2d 96, 191 N.E.2d 4!16 (196!1). 
20 Guilmet v. Campbell, !185 Mich. 57, 188 N.W .2d 601 (1971). 
21 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 756, 296 N.E.2d at 186. 
22 Id . 
. 23 Id. 
\/ 24 See, e.g., in re Mayberry, 295 Mass. 155, !I N.E.2d 248 (19!16). 
16
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1973 [1973], Art. 7
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1973/iss1/7
§4.5 CONTRACIS 121 
enforcement while others do not. Although a clean division might have 
been preferable in the Sullivan case, it is clear that there will be types of 
promises which straddle the dividing line. Such are physician-patient 
contracts which, in the overall pattern, fall somewhere between the com-
mercial promises which merit judicial enforcement and the personal and 
social agreements in which the law has refused to intervene.211 Certainly 
some physician-patient agreements are not as commercial in nature as 
others. For example, agreements by physicians to perform highly com-
plex, lifesaving operations involving newly developed techniques bear 
little resemblance to common commercial agreements to provide services. 
Such surgery usually occurs in a context which is highly personal, both 
for the patient and the physician, and which is virtually devoid of bar-
gaining. The court in Sullivan recognized that physicians often make 
statements which are meant only to reassure the patient and not intended 
to be binding promises of medical success.2e It was further noted that 
patients often rely unreasonably upon such statements or may claim to 
have so relied upon them after being disappointed by the medical out-
come.27 
At the other end of the spectrum are physician-patient agreements 
which have commercial characteristics. Promises by physicians to perform 
routine elective surgery, like the cosmetic surgery involved in the Sullivan 
case, closely resemble commercial contracts for services. The position of 
the physician approaches the status of a vendor, and bargaining is possible 
since the surgery is elective, routine and presumably deliverable by many 
physicians. Since elective cosmetic surgery does not involve medical neces-
sity, a physician's reassurances in such a context approach the commercial 
practice of "puffing." When such reassurances include promises and serve 
as an inducement to accept an elective medical service, there is little 
justification for treating them differently from promises made in non-
medical settings. 
A similar group of physician-patient agreements which is generally 
considered enforceable is that in which a physician promises to employ 
or not to employ a certain procedure which is completely within . his 
controJ.2B Exemplifying this group of contracts is the contract dealt with 
in Frank v. Maliniak,2e a case in which the physician performing a rhino-
plasty promised to keep all incisions inside the mouth and failed to do 
so. The enforcement of this type of agreement reflects the judicial recog-
211 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §34, at 53-54 (1 vol. ed. 1952). 
28 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 756, 296 N.E.2d at 186. 
27 Id. 
28 Frank v. Maliniak, 232 App. Div. 278, 249 N.Y.S. 514 (1931); Steward v. Rudner, 
349 Mich. 459, 84 N .W .2d 816 (1957) (plaintiff contracted with defendant physician to 
receive a caesarian section and the defendant failed to perform the procedure). 
29 232 App. Div. 278,249 N.Y.S. 514 (1931). 
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nition that once the impediment of scientific uncertainty is completely 
removed, a physician must perform as promised, like any vendor of 
services. 
Continuing the process of determining whether physician-patient con-
tracts should be held to be legally binding contracts, the court in Sullivan 
compared the practical disadvantages of non-enforcement and ready en-
forcement. It observed that a rule permitting easy maintenance of actions 
for breaches of promises allegedly made by physicians might result in a 
tremendous expansion in the pr~ctice of "defensive medicine." On the 
other hand, a rule disallowing all such actions would leave the public 
"exposed to the enticements of charlatans, and confidence in the profession 
might ultimately be shaken."ao Fearful of the practical consequences of 
either of these extre~es, the court espoused, in dicta, the cautious "middle 
of the road" position of allowing contract actions but insisting on clear 
proof of contract formation.a1 However, the same cautious approach of 
the court can be described more precisely as the creation of a means to 
give careful scrutiny to each physician-patient agreement and determine 
on a case-by-case basis whether the alleged agreement belongs within the 
set of legally enforceable promises. 
On the issue of damages, the Sullivan court discussed the relative pro-
priety of the reliance and the expectancy measures of damages. Although 
no choice between these two measures had to be made due to the fact the 
plaintiff did not seek to recover for her full expectations, the dicta of the 
opinion seemed to indicate a judicial preference for the reliance measure 
of damages. The court defined the reliance measure of damages as that 
measure which would produce a reoovery sufficient to "put the plaintiff 
back in the position he occupied just before the parties entered the agree-
ment, to compensate him for the detriments he suffered in reliance upon 
the agreement."B2 The expectancy measure was defined by the court as 
that measure which would produce a recovery "intended to put the plain-
tiff in the position he would be in if the contract had been performed."88 
Simply put, this measure, as applied to the Sullivan case, would have been 
the difference between the nose promised and the nose after the opera-
tions. Commentators Fuller and Perdue contend that the expectancy 
measure is just "the reflection of a normative order . . . an unstated 
ought. "84 In contrast, the reliance measure reflects an actual detriment 
or act on the part of a party to a contract. Fuller and Perdue maintain 
that there are certain situations which require enforcement of the "ought" 
and other situations which merely require a restoration of the status quo 
ao 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 756, 296 N.E.2d at 186. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 758,296 N.E.2d at 187. 
aa Id. at 757,296 N.E.2d at 186. 
84 Fuller Be Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: I, 46 Yale L.J •. 52, 
53 (1936), dted in Sullivan, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 759, 296 N.E.2d at 187. 
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which existed before the contract was made.BII The former situations are 
those where the expectancy measure of damages is properly applied and 
the latter require damages based on the reliance theory.ae Professor 
Farnsworth assesses the difference between the two theories in a different 
light: the reliance measure may be characterized as an encouragement to 
promisees to rely while the expectancy measure may be characterized as 
punishment of the promisor.B7 
Other distinctions between the two measures are based upon commercial 
and economic considerations. In most marketplace transactions the expec-
tancy measure of damages is simple and readily ascertainable, while the 
reliance measure may include many uncertain factors such as lost oppor-
tunities.88 Strong and stable commerce depends upon a willingness of 
those in the marketplace to contract. Any enforcement of contracts, 
whether damages are based on a theory of restitution, reliance, or expec-
tancy, encourages good faith agreements. However, the expectancy mea-
sure of damages theoretically assures a non-breacher of the benefit of his 
bargain, . while the restitution and reliance measures merely attempt to 
restore the non-breacher to his position prior to the agreement. Clearly, 
then, a general willingness to contract is usually best encouraged by the 
availability of a recovery of damages based on the non-breacher's full 
expectations. These social and economic distinctions between the reliance 
and expectancy measures of damages are relevant to most judicial deter-
minations of contract damage issues. This relevance has been discussed 
by several courts, including the Sullivan court. 
As was noted in the opinion in Sullivan,a9 at least one jurisdiction 
has awarded full expectancy damages for the breach of a physician-patient 
contract,40 while others have awarded only damages based on reliance.n 
The classic example of an award based on the expectancy theory of 
damages is the New Hampshire case of Hawkins v. McGee.42 In that case 
the physician promised the patient that he could surgically make the 
111 Id. at 56. 
88 Id. at 54. 
BT Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 1145, 
1147 (1970). . 
88 5 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §1085 at 209 (1964). 
89 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 757-58, 296 N.E.2d at 186. 
40 Cloutier v. Kasheta, 105 N.H. 262, 197 A.2d 627 (1964): Lakeman v. LaFrance, 102 
N.H. 800, 156 A.2d 125 (1959); McQuaid v. Michou, 85 N.H. 299, 157 A. 881 (1982); 
Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929). 
41 Stewart v. Rudner, 849 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957); Robins v. Finestone, 508 
N.Y. 545, 127 N.E.2d 550 (1955): Colvin v. Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794 
(1949); Hirsch v. Safian, 257 App. Div. 212, 12 N.Y.S.2d 568 (19!19): Frank v. Maliniak, 
2!12 App. Div. 278, 249 N.Y.S. 514 (19!11); Frankel v. Wolper, 181 App. Div. 485, 169 
N.Y.S. 15 (1918), aff'd, 228 N.Y. 582, 169 N.Y.S. 1094, 127 91!1 (1918). 
42 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929). Later cases have refined the rule in the direction 
of applying the expectancy theory of damages in actions on physician-patient contracts. 
See the cases other than Hawkins listed in note 40 supra. , 
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patient's badly deformed hand a perfect hand. The Supreme Court of 
New Hampshire held that the plaintiff was entitled to damages measured 
by the expectancy theory, that is, he was entitled to recover the difference 
between the value to him of a perfect hand as promised and the value 
of the hand in its resultant condition. No other jurisdiction has developed 
a coherent and identifiable policy concerning damages recoverable for 
breaches of physician-patient contracts. The New York courts have indi-
cated in dicta that a reliance type measure of damages is appropriate; 
however, they have not specifically confronted a claim for damages based 
on the expectancy theory and therefore have not actually decided the 
issue.48 
Although the last paragraph of Sullivan contains the court's assertion 
that it did not decide between the damage theories of expectancy and 
reliance,44 the court nevertheless expresses its preference for the reliance 
theory in dicta when it concludes: "There is much to be said, then, for 
applying a reliance measure to the present facts, and we have only to add 
that our cases are not unreceptive to the use of that formula in special 
situations."41S By favoring the reliance measure, the court again appears 
to split contract risks on public policy grounds. The court states that a 
recovery based on simple restitution would be "too meager" while "an 
expectancy recovery might well be excessive."46 The court lists several 
factors which suggest "moderation as to the breadth of the recovery ·that 
should be permitted": the fact that the defendant in Sullivan was absolved 
of negligence, the lack of a willful breach, the disproportion of the physi-
cian's fee to the expectancy value, and the difficulty of putting a value on 
the condition that would have resulted.47 The selection of these factors 
as important to a contract action reflects the court's decision that express 
physician-patient contracts are unique, since it is well established that 
willfulness, negligence, amount of consideration, and difficulty in assess-
ing value are not normally issues in contract actions. Just as the court 
adopts a middle of the road position by suggesting a clear proof require-
ment for contract formation, the court's espousal of the reliance measure 
of damages indicates its desire that there be some judicial balancing in-
volved in any determination of the breadth of damages recoverable for 
the breach of an express physician-patient contract. By favoring the appli-
cation of the reliance measure of damages, the court expresses a policy of 
assuring the non-breaching patient reasonable recovery for his actual losses 
48 Robins v. Finestone, !108 N.Y. 54!1, 127 N.E.2d !1!10 (1955); Colvin v. Smith, 276 
App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1949); Hirsch v. Safian, 257 App. Div. 212, 12 N.Y.S.2d 
568 (19!19); Frank v. Maliniak, 232 App. Div. 278, 249 N.Y.S. 514 (19!11); Frankel v. 
Wolper, 181 App. Div. 485, 169 N.Y.S. 15, aff'd 228 N.Y. 582, 127 N.E. 913, 169 N.Y.S. 
1094 (1918). 
44 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 762, 296 N.E.2d at 189. 
415 Id. at 759-60, 296 N.E.2d at 188. 
46 Id. at 759, 296 N.E.2d at 187. 
47 Id. at 759, 296 N.E.2d at 187-88. 
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while protecting the non-willful breaching physician from the excessive 
liability which might result from the application of the expectancy mea-
sure of damages. Perhaps the court feared harsh expectancy judgments 
would in effect penalize the physician, induce him to practice conserva-
tively, unjustly enrich certain plaintiffs, and raise the overall costs of 
medical service. On the other hand, it is possible that the court felt that 
recoveries based on the restitution measure would be unjust to patients, 
who would normally incur many incidental expenses and frequently suffer 
physical injuries resulting in losses far greater than the amount of the 
physician's fee. 
Again, it is important to examine the action for breach of an express 
physician-patient contract to determine whether there is a further rational 
basis for awarding a recovery based on reliance rather than the usual 
expectancy measure of damages. Fuller and Perdue describe the set of 
contracts for which recovery based on reliance is appropriate as those 
contracts which stand on the threshold of commerce: too social in nature 
to merit expectancy damages, but close enough to bargains to require 
judicial intervention.48 Earlier in this article it was suggested that 
physician-patient contracts stand on this threshold for purposes of deter-
mining whether a contract has been formed. The same analysis applies 
to damage recovery; that is, physician-patient contracts straddle the border 
between enforceable and non-enforceable promises and are consequently 
quite different from those commercial contracts which form the core of 
the set of enforceable promises. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider a 
theory of recovery based on this peripheral position which differs from the 
usual theory of recovery in commercial contexts. The basic inquiry, then, 
is whether the elements which generally demand an expectancy award 
for a breach of promise are present in the context of physician-patient 
contracts. 
The quasi-commercial context of physician-patient agreements appears 
to be devoid of the commercial and economic elements which generally 
support an award based on expectation. Clearly there is no basic social 
policy to encourage medicine as a "business" based on willingness to 
contract. The economic factors which require a commercial marketplace 
based on promises to pay, deliver, employ, or serve are absent in the 
medical marketplace. The physician-patient contract is a relatively isolated 
agreement which is not usually interdependent with other sectors of the 
economy. Therefore, commerce in general is not benefited by the willing-
ness of a physician and patient to contract. In fact, there is a distinct 
policy to discourage a medical marketplace which might be full of charla-
tans and ultimately detract from the scientific and ethical aspects of the 
medical profession,49 Furthermore, the agreement to treat is generally 
48 Fuller Be Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46 Yale L.J. 37!1, 
397 (19!17). 
49 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 756, 296 N.E.2d at 186. 
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based upon the patient's reliance upon the physician to conform to a high 
standard of medical practice and not necessarily to guarantee a specific 
cure or resulL The patient hopes for, rather than expects, complete suc-
cess, which is often a result beyond the physician's control. It thus appears 
that there is little justification for utilizing expectancy damages as a means 
to encourage physician-patient contracts. 
The patient's expectations, unlike those of many parties to purely 
commercial contracts, cannot be measured more simply than his reliances, 
and consequently, application of the expectancy measure of damages for 
the breach of a physician-patient contract cannot be justified as the most 
convenient and equitable measure of damages. It is much easier in a. busi-
ness context to award lost profits than to attempt to assess all of the 
reliances which a business places upon a contract. Conversely, it is easier 
to assess a patient's reliances-medical expenses, pain and suffering, 
mental distress, loss of income--than it is to· assess his lost profit or gain. 
There is no readily ascertainable market value of a re-shaped nose, a 
successful caesarian section, or the cure of a disease. As the Sullivan court 
notes, an attempt to put a value on such an expected condition often 
strains the imagination of the fact finder.11o 
In a purely commercial context there is an assumption that the reliance 
and expectancy measures will yield damages which are somewhat similar 
in amount because business reliances will reftect the profits anticipated.lil 
. Coupled with this assumption is the further assumption that most parties 
to commercial contracts have the knowledge and bargaining power which 
makes it unlikely that a party to a commercial contract will make ex-
tremely high profits from a bargain in comparison to its reliances on that 
bargain.11ll These assumptions cannot be made in the physician-patient 
context. The reliances of a patient reftect the medical character of a pro-
cedure, not the potential gain. Certainly, pain, suffering, and loss of in-
come are virtually unrelated to the gain anticipated from a medical 
procedure. Similarly, cost is not always related to the benefit a patient 
receives. Nor is there a bargaining process in the formation of a physician-
patient contract which would tend to equalize reliance and gain. 
Finally, the function of the expectancy measure as a penalty and deter-
rent must be examined in the physician~patient contract context. An award 
based on the expectancy measlire might deter the formation of physician-
patient contracts, but probably not breaches thereof. It is improbable that 
a physician would willfully breach a contract with one patient in order to 
take advantage of another bargain, as might be the case in a more com-
mercial context. ·Such willful breaches would frequently constitute negli-
gence and be ·actionable under the tort theory of malpractice.li8 Therefore, 
110 Id. at 759,296 N.E.2d at 188. 
Ill 5 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §996, at 17 (1964). 
112 Id. 
liB W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts §S2, at 161-66 (4th ed. 1971). 
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it is improbable that the increased damages available under the expectancy 
measure would be effective as a deterrent to breach. 
Since the traditional reasons, discussed above, for allowing a non-
breacher to recover damages for his full expectations do not appear to 
be applicable to the physician-patient contract, it is rational for the courts 
to restrict the application of the expectancy measure of damages in suits 
on such contracts. Therefore, what appears to be a policy decision in 
Sullivan to protect physicians by allowing patients to recover only dam-
ages for their reliances, may actually be a decision not to apply the "ought" 
of the expectancy measure of damages to contracts which are on the pe-
riphery of the set of enforceable promises. The court in Sullivan noted, 
and thus appeared to accept, the Fuller and Perdue argument that "the 
reasons for granting damages for broken promises to the extent of the 
expectancy are at their strongest when the promises are made in a business 
context, ... they become weaker as the context shifts from a commercial 
to a noncommercial field."ll4 
Traditionally damages awarded for the breach of a contract do not 
encompass compensation for pain and suffering.511 There have been a few 
exceptions to this principle; common carrier-passenger contracts,116 inn-
keeper-guest contracts,117 and physician-patient contracts in some jurisdic-
tions.lls In the Massachusetts case of McClean v. University Club,11o the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that, on the facts, pain and suffering could 
be alleged as elements of damage since they flowed directly, naturally and 
proximately from the breach of the contract involved.60 In that case an 
innkeeper breached the implied terms of the contractual relation between 
the plaintiff-guest and himself. One of these terms was that the defendant 
would not interfere with the convenience and comfort of the plaintiff, 
its guest, nor abuse nor insult him, nor engage in any conduct which 
would subject him to mental distress or personal injury. The defendant 
breached this term by forcibly removing the seriously ill defendant from 
his room and evicting him in an unreasonable manner which resulted in 
serious physical injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiff recovered damages 
for pain, suffering, and mental anguish. Other jurisdictions have also 
awarded damages for pain and suffering for the breach of a contract61 
as in the Mississippi case of Hood v. Moffett,62 where a physician con-
114 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 759, 296 N.E.2d at 188. 
1111 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §1076, at 426-27 (1964). 
116 See, e.g., Leatherman v. Gateway Trans. Co., 331 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1964). 
117 See, e.g., McClean v. University Club, 327 Mass. 68, 97 N.E.2d 174 (1951). 
58 See, e.g., Hood v. Moffett, 109 Miss. 757, 69 So. 664 (1915). 
59 327 Mass. 68, 97 N.E.2d 174 (1951). 
60 Id. at 76, 97 N.E.2d at 180. 
61 See, e.g., McQuaid v. Michou, 85 N.H. 299, 157 A. 881 (1932); Coffey v. North-
western Hosp. Assoc., 96 Ore. 100, 183 P. 762 (1919); Galveston, H. and S.A. Ry. Co. v. 
Rubio, 65 S.W. ll26 (Tex. 1901). 
82 109 Miss. 757, 69 So. 664 (1915). 
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tracted to provide prenatal care and breached this promise. The court 
there held that damages could be recovered for physical pain and suffer-
ing resulting from the breach. 6a A general statement covering these princi-
ples is given by Sutherland in his treatise on damages: 
[W]here a contract is made to secure relief from a particular incon-
venience or annoyance, or to confer a particular enjoyment, the 
breach, so far as it disappoints in respect of that purpose, may give 
a right to damages appropriate to the objects of the contract.64 
Sullivan is the first Massachusetts case based on the breach of an express 
physician-patient contract in which the courts have applied the above 
principle and awarded damages for a plaintiff's pain and suffering.6~> The 
court in Sullivan specifically rejected the tenet, espoused by several New 
York courts,66 that demands for compensation for pain, suffering, and 
mental distress are uncharacteristic of a contract claim.67 Developing its 
own standards, the court then stated that the "subject matter and back-
ground"6S of the contract are controlling and accordingly found that the 
physician-patient contract before it had as its subject and essence the 
pain, suffering, and mental distress of the plaintiff. This analysis resulted 
in the holding that "[s]uffering or distress resulting from the breach going 
beyond that which was envisaged by the treatment as agreed, should be 
compensable on the same ground as the worsening of the patient's condi-
tion because of the breach."69 
Like pain and suffering, mental distress has traditionally been un-
compensable in contract actions with a few exceptions: actions for breaches 
of innkeeper-guest contracts, 70 carrier-passenger contracts, 71 and physician-
patient contracts in some jurisdictions.72 The Massachusetts case of Frewen 
v. Page18 is precedent for allowing a recovery for mental anguish in a 
contract action. An innkeeper illegally entered his guest's room and pub-
licly insulted the guest. The guest recovered for the resulting mental 
distress in an action for the breach of the innkeeper's promise to protect 
the privacy of the guest and treat him with consideration.74 In McClean v. 
68 Id. at 766-67, 69 So. at 666. 
64 A. Sutherland, Law of Damages §92, at 330 (1916). 
611 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 762, 296 N.E.2d at 189. 
66 Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955); Colvin v. Smith; 276 
App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1949); Frankel v. Wolper, 181 App. Div. 485, 169 N.Y.S. 
15 (1918). 
67 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 761, 296 N.E.2d at 189. 
68 Id. at 760, 296 N.E.2d at 189. 
69 Id. at 761, 296 N.E.2d 189. 
70 See, e.g., Frewen v. Page, 238 Mass. 499, 131 N.E. 475 (1921). 
71 See, e.g., Leatherman v. Gateway Trans. Co., 331 F .2d 241 (7th Cir. 1964). 
72 See, e.g., Hood v. Moffett, 109 Miss. 757, 69 So. 664 (1915). 
73 238 Mass. 499, 131 N.E. 475 (1921). 
74 Id. at 503-06, 131 N.E. at 477. 
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University Clubn the Supreme Judicial Court again allowed recovery for 
m.ental distreSs and quoted from the New York case of Boyce v. Greeley 
Square Hotel Co.:16 
"As a general rule, mental suffering resulting from a breach of con-
tract is not a subject of compensation. The rule does not obtain, 
however, as between a common carrier or an innkeeper and an 
insulted and abused passenger or guest, or the proprietor of a 
public resort and a patron publicly ejected."77 
The trial court in Sullivan allowed the jury to include in their assess-
ment of damages the effect of the awareness of disfigurement on the mind 
of the plaintiff. 78 Their evaluation of such an effect could include con-
sideration of the plaintiff's profession, but only as to the effect on her 
mental state and not with regard to lost earnings.'I'D The court held that 
"when the contract calls for an operation on the person of the plaintiff, 
psychological as well as physical injury may be expected to figure some-
where in the recovery, depending on the particular circumstances."so The 
court found that the subject and background of the contract for nasal 
surgery involved the mental state of the plaintiff, that is, the awareness 
of her appearance, and therefore allowed the recovery of damages for 
harm to the plaintiff's mental state.s1 Since the nose as it originally ap-
peared admittedly caused the plaintiff some unhappiness, it was foresee-
able that a worsening of the nasal appearance would cause the plaintiff 
further distress. If a disfigurement causes no functional impairment, then 
its only impact is upon the patient's mental awareness of disfigurement. 
Certainly the physical injury is no less deserving of compensation simply 
because its only impact is mental. 
It is necessary to examine this instruction given by the trial court, that 
the jury should take into consideration in its assessment of damages for 
mental distress the fact that the plaintiff was a professional entertainer.s2 
Apparently the court believed the defendant could be held liable for the 
excess mental distress that the plaintiff might suffer due to her disfigured 
nose because her profession involved public appearances. The court noted 
that the defendant was aware of the plaintiff's pro£ession83 and held that 
the excess distress was foreseeable. This excess did not represent loss of 
earning capacity, but rather represented a relatively subjective loss of 
enjoyment. That is, the court seemed to acknowledge the fact that al-
711 !127 Mass. 68,97 N.E.2d 174 (1951). This case is discussed in text at note 59 supra. 
'1'6 228 N.Y. 106, 126 N.E. 647 (1920). 
77 Id. at Ill, 126 N.E. at 649. 
78 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 754,296 N.E.2d at 185. 
79 Id. at 755, 296 N.E.2d at 185. 
so Id. at 760-61, 296 N .E.2d at 189. 
81 Id. at 762,296 N.E.2d at 189. 
82 Id. at 754, 296 N.E.2d at 185. 
83 Id. at 754, 296 N.E.2d at 184-85. 
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though the plaintiff might not lose any income from the disfigurement, 
she would not enjoy her profession as much as she did prior to the dis-
figurement. The jurisdictions which have considered the issue of loss of 
enjoyment are divided on the question of whether compensation for such 
loss should be allowed. 84 Massachusetts courts have not specifically ad-
dressed this issue. The court in Sullivan did not discuss its decision that 
the plaintiff could be compensated for this loss and apparently did not 
conceive of itself as establishing a common law damage rule. Perhaps they 
believed that this particular mental distress was inseparable from the 
general mental distress which the plaintiff suffered. 
In conclusion, the Sullivan case represents the first action brought for 
the breach of an express physician-patient contract in Massachusetts in 
which a plaintiff-patient has recovered as fully in a contract action as 
she would have under a tort theory. Although the issue of contract forma-
tion was handled in dicta, the court formulated a cautious judicial policy 
for dealing with actions alleging breaches of express physician-patient 
contracts. Basically, the court stated that in the proper situation such a 
contract can be formed and will be legally binding. By suggesting that 
there must be "clear proof' of contract formation, the court indicated its 
intention to carefully scrutinize all claims alleging breaches of express 
physician-patient contracts. Future Massachusetts courts will have to de-
cide whether to apply the clear proof requirement suggested in the case 
and, if they do adopt it, they will have to determine what amounts to 
"clear proof." Conceivably the standard could be construed to require 
rigorous proof which would severely restrict the viability of the contract 
cause of action since, as discussed earlier, most physician-patient agree-
ments are not obvious contracts. In addition, an elevated proof require-
ment might allow appellate courts to review the factual holdings of lower 
courts more freely. If, on the other hand, the clear proof standard is con-
strued to require little or no more than a preponderance of the evidence, 
it is unlikely that physician-patient contract actions will be significantly 
affected by the imposition of the clear proof burden. 
The damages which the court held recoverable in Sullivan included 
compensation for pain, suffering, and mental distress-items traditionally 
noncompensable in contract actions. This holding was the result of the 
judicial determination that the "subject matter and background" of the 
Sullivan physician-patient contract made such damages appropriate. The 
availability of such broad tort-like damages for the breach of a physician-
patient contract will probably have significant impact on future medical 
litigation in Massachusetts. Freed from the traditional damage limitations, 
the contract cause of action could become a viable alternative to the usual 
84 See, e.g., McAlister v. Carl, 2!1!1 Md. 446, 197 A.2d 140 (1964) (loss of enjoyment 
held a proper element of damages); but see Hogan v. Santa Fe Trial Trans. Co., 148 
K.an. 720, 85 P .2d 28 (19!18). 
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negligence cause of action alleged by patients against physicians. Once a 
contract claim surmounts the "clear proof" hurdle, it enjoys two impor-
tant advantages over a malpractice claim. One advantage results from the 
fact that negligence is not an issue in contract actions. The often difficult 
proofs of causation and harm required to establish negligence are un-
necessary to prove contract formation and subsequent breach. Secondly, 
unlike the proof of negligence, the proof of a contract and its breach does 
not involve the establishment of duties of care or community standards; 
therefore, expert medical testimony is unnecessary and the plaintiff is not 
hampered by the notorious "conspiracy of silence" among potential medi-
cal witnesses. Since contract actions enjoy these advantages, and since a 
Massachusetts plaintiff can now recover as fully in contract as in tort, a 
significant increase in the number of actions alleging a breach of an 
express physician-patient contract is probable in Massachusetts. 
The Sullivan decision reflects a judicial determination that physician-
patient agreements can be legally binding contracts. However, the decision 
also clearly indicates a judicial policy of caution with respect to such con-
tracts since they often fall on the boundary between the group of com-
monly enforced compacts which are commercial in character and those 
agreements which society has decided are too "social" in nature to be 
legally enforced. The Supreme Judicial Court has suggested, through 
Sullivan, that this caution will probably be evidenced through the appli-
cation of an elevated proof requirement, either explicitly or implicitly, 
and through a judicial policy of allowing damage recoveries based only 
on the patient's reliances rather than on the usually more extensive 
measure based on the patient's expectations. 
SHELLEY MciNTYRE DRAPER 
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